Author: Hubert FOY | Director & Senior Research Scientist | AFRICSIS

For a long time, nuclear energy was a nonstarter in World Bank corridors. The 2013 formalization of its ban on nuclear funding, prompted by global anxieties after the Fukushima disaster, had become a fixture of development finance orthodoxy. Countries that might have entertained the idea of tapping into nuclear power were, in essence, told to look elsewhere. That era is now ending. World Bank President Ajay Banga’s recent announcement signals a dramatic policy turn: the Bank will, for the first time in over a decade, support nuclear energy projects in developing countries.

This is not just a nod to changing sentiment. It is a structural shift with ripple effects likely to reach deep into Africa’s energy and development policy landscapes. For countries confronting the twin pressures of unreliable electricity access and rising demand, nuclear had always been a theoretical option, one overshadowed by financing constraints and institutional hesitation. Now, the table is being reset.

Banga’s message to staff was clear: the World Bank Group is re-entering the nuclear space. But it is doing so in a measured way, not through sudden capital injections into full-scale reactor builds, but by helping extend the lifespan of existing nuclear plants, supporting grid upgrades, and exploring the potential of small modular reactors, or SMRs. This strategy, especially the emphasis on SMRs, is significant. These smaller units are touted as more scalable, potentially cheaper, and better suited for countries with smaller grid capacities or institutional gaps. For African states like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and even newcomers like Rwanda, the policy reversal could enable exploratory projects to become tangible.

But one should not mistake the shift for a blanket endorsement of nuclear. The World Bank still intends to fund a mix of renewables and, in some contexts, natural gas. Nuclear is now on the menu, but not the default. What changes is that it’s no longer forbidden territory. This flexibility aligns with Banga’s “all of the above” energy philosophy, where countries can choose the mix that best suits their needs and capacities, as long as it supports development and decarbonization.

There is more at play here than internal policy evolution. The shift also reflects growing geopolitical and institutional alignment around nuclear’s role in decarbonization. The Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy by 2050, signed by 22 countries at COP28 in Dubai, reset the tone for global nuclear ambition. Institutions like the European Investment Bank and countries like Canada and Germany, once hesitant, are recalibrating their stance. The World Bank was increasingly out of step with these currents. Its ban stood as an outdated relic of a more risk-averse past. Now, with electricity demand in developing countries projected to more than double by 2035 and annual investments in power generation, grids, and storage needing to nearly double as well, the numbers no longer support exclusion.

Still, the move comes with serious implications for Africa. One is capacity: institutional, technical, and human. Nuclear energy is not something you can simply decide to deploy. It requires an entire ecosystem of legal frameworks, safety infrastructure, regulatory bodies, public trust, and technical education pipelines. The World Bank’s decision will not, on its own, fill these gaps. But it changes the incentive landscape. With the Bank back in play, countries may now find it easier to justify investments in nuclear governance, partner with the IAEA and other agencies, and attract attention from suppliers and bilateral donors who previously saw Africa as too uncertain a bet for nuclear investment.

Another implication is strategic: Africa’s engagement with nuclear energy has always been about more than power generation. For some governments, it’s a signal of scientific ambition, national pride, or regional leadership. For others, nuclear is about long-term energy sovereignty, especially in light of rising fossil fuel volatility and uncertain hydropower yields due to climate change. With global institutions softening, African governments that have flirted with nuclear ambitions but hesitated due to financial risk now have more room to act. The World Bank’s re-entry could be the green light they have been waiting for.

But caution is warranted. The Bank’s history is instructive. The only World Bank loan ever issued for nuclear power was in 1959: $40 million to Italy. That is the scale of the institutional distance now being bridged. More recently, its development philosophy has prioritized “do no harm” over industrial ambition, especially when it comes to large infrastructure projects. Nuclear challenges that paradigm, particularly when it involves long lead times, public risk perception, and disposal questions. So, while the door is open, it is not clear how far or how fast countries will walk through it.

African leadership will be key. Those interested in nuclear development will need to move carefully but deliberately: assessing site feasibility, setting up independent regulators, adhering to and implementing relevant nuclear conventions, investing in nuclear education, and engaging the public. Donors and multilateral partners should not view this moment as a green light to push nuclear at all costs, but rather as an opportunity to support African countries that choose nuclear from an informed and sovereign perspective.

The IAEA, in particular, will likely see increased demand for its technical cooperation and advisory functions. For years, it has worked with newcomer countries through the Milestones Approach, a phased process for building nuclear infrastructure. If even a handful of African states signal readiness to advance through this model, the Agency will need more resources, staff, and coordination with institutions like the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and bilateral development agencies.

At the policy level, this could also prompt reevaluation of regional energy strategies. Organizations like the African Union and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy may find themselves fielding more questions about nuclear’s place in the continent’s energy future. Countries with advanced nuclear ambitions, like South Africa and Egypt, might be looked to as mentors or cautionary tales, depending on how their own projects evolve.

One practical near-term issue will be financing grid modernization. Whether it’s SMRs or conventional reactors, nuclear requires stable, high-capacity grids. Many African countries still suffer from fragile transmission infrastructure, making grid upgrades a necessary precondition. Here, the World Bank’s involvement may be most immediate. Funding smart grids, regional interconnectors, and transmission corridors might be the pragmatic stepping stone to any future nuclear project.

This announcement will likely generate excitement, skepticism, and political maneuvering in equal measure. But what matters most is what happens next. Not just which countries express interest, but which ones do the hard work of governance, risk assessment, public engagement, and cross-sector coordination. Nuclear is not a magic fix, and the Bank’s backing does not erase the long timelines or the scrutiny it brings.

Still, the very fact that nuclear is back on the table for development finance is a historic shift. It reflects not just changing global energy priorities but a deeper recognition that energy security and development goals cannot be met with artificial constraints. For African nations that are ready—and willing—to do the work, the opportunity has returned. The challenge now is to ensure that access does not outpace preparedness.